c/o 12400 Ventura Blvd. #137
Studio City, California (18 U.S.C. 1342)
Lisa Jan Precious
c/o 12358 Ventura Blvd. #245
Studio City, California (18 U.S.C. 1342)
c/o 5152 Sepulveda, Suite 205
Sherman Oaks, California (18 U.S.C. 1342)
Stephen Mitchell, Lisa Jan Precious, Kathleen
In propria persona [NOT PRO SE]
In the superior court for Los Angeles county, California
FOOTNOTE 1: Concurrent with and equivalent to the district court as created in the Constitution of the State of California of 1849, and the seventeenth judicial dietrict, see Stats 1872, ch. CXIV, p. 116
Stephen Mitchell; Lisa Jan Precious; Kathleen
DAVID MISCAVIGE, a person, in the capacity
as Chairman of the Board of the Religious Technology Center and Inspector
General of the Church of Scientology
MIKE RINDER, a person, in the capacity as head of the Office of Special Affairs International
JOHN/JANE DOE #1, a person, in the capacity as head of the L. Ron Hubbard Library
JOHN/JANE DOE, #2-99
Case No. BC175367
Verified Complaint for Libel
Pursuant to: Stats 1851, ch. V, 62, 63
[and only In The Nature Of: Civil Code Sections 44, 45, 45(a)]
Stephen Mitchell, Lisa Jan Precious, and
Kathleen Carey, (hereinafter, the
1. Plaintiffs are now, and at all times mentioned in this complaint have been, in propria persona [not PRO SE], living on the Land within Los Angeles county, in California, one of the United States of America; with express and explicit reservation of all Vested Natural, Inherent, Common Law, and Inalienable Rights, whether enumerated or not in the Constitution of the State of California of 1849; without admitting to any jurisdiction of the Constitution of the State of California of 1879; the Political Code, the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Penal Code of the State of California, each one though enacted in 1872 were never made a part of the Public Statutes of California, nor any amendments or additions of any type to any of the foregoing; without representation of any attorney-at- law, but with assistance of "counsel" by Right within the meaning of the Constitution of the State of California of 1849, Article I, Section 21.
FOOTNOTE 2: For the reason that Article XXII, Sections 3, 10, 11, and 12 were repealed on November 8, 1960 (see Affidavit of Truth in support of Verified Complaint for Libel)
FOOTNOTE 3: All Public statutes of California must prevail over any code which it contravenes or is inconsistent with. See text of the original Political Code at Sections 4479, and 4494,
2. Defendant, DAVID MISCAVIGE (hereinafter the "Defendant"), is now, and at all times mentioned in this complaint has been the Chairman of the Board of the Religious Technology Center and Inspector General of the Church of Scientology.
3. Defendant, MIKE RINDER (hereinafter the "Defendant"), is now, and at all times mentioned in this complaint has been the head of the Office of Special Affairs International.
4. Defendant, JOHN/JANE DOE #1 (hereinafter the "Defendant"), is now, and at all times mentioned in this complaint has been the head of the L. Ron Hubbard Library.
Venue and Jurisdiction
5. The Plaintiffs hereby declare that this Complaint for Libel has been filed within California, one of the United States of America; within the boundaries of California as designated in the Constitution for the State of California of 1849; within Los Angeles county as established by statute under the authority of the Constitution for California of 1849, and therefore within the seventeenth judicial district as established by statute at Stats 1872, ch. CXIV, p. 116.
Based on the foregoing, it shall be construed for the purposes of this case that the "Superior Court" for Los Angeles county is concurrent with and equivalent to the seventeenth judicial district of the district court as created in the Constitution of the State of California of 1849. The Plaintiffs are prepared to present evidence of fact and law to support this position, if the Defendants choose to challenge or contest this venue and jurisdiction.
6. The Plaintiffs hereby demand that the Court take judicial notice of the following:
6a. The Constitution of the State of California of 1849, as amended through 1878, is currently valid and in effect.
6b. The quasi/constitution of 1879 amounts to nothing more than an "extension of the code" and any lawful effect that it may or may not have does not supersede the Constitution for the State of California of 1849 as applied to the People of California.
The Code Was Not Enacted As "Law"
7. The original four divisions of the California codes have all been attributed with "approval" dates as follows:
The Penal Code, approved February 14, 1872
The Code of Civil Procedure, approved March 11, 1872
The Political Code, approved March 12, 1872
The Civil Code, approved March 21, 1872
FOOTNOTE 4: Actually approved on February 15, 1872, (see Senate Journal, 19th session of the legislature, p.349)
FOOTNOTE 5: Actually approved on March 12, 1872, (see Senate Journal, 19th session of the legislature, p.518)
8. The Plaintiffs have investigated the volume of the Statutes of California for the nineteenth session of the legislature, 1871-72, and the Journals of the Senate and the Assembly for said session, at the Los Angeles County Law Library, and discovered the following:
8a. Within the entire Table of Contents of the volume of the "Statutes of California" for the nineteenth session of the legislature there is no listing of the Senate Bills numbered 221, 363, 375, and 430 having been assigned a "chapter number" as a Public Statute of California.
FOOTNOTE 6: These four Senate Bills can be specifically identified by number in the Senate Journal for the nineteenth session of the legislature, 1871-72, at pages 308, 489, 497, & 575.
8b. "The four codes were not published as part of the Statutes of 1871-72 and were not given chapter numbers... ". Kleps, The Revision and Codification of California Statutes 1849- 1953, 42 Calif. L. Rev. 766, 775.
8c. There is no way to verify the original text of the original four divisions of the code. The original bills that are held in the State Archives are in such a condition that it would literally be impossible to determine if any or all of the handwritten additions on these bills were done before the governor signed each bill. This unique condition of not having been published as part of the Statutes of California 1871-72, indisputably separates them from the rest of the Statutes of California, and of necessity places them in an inferior status.
8d. The code commissioners were never given the authority to create a "new body of law". They were only authorized to "...revise all the statutes of this State...". Stats1869-70, c.516 Section 2
8e. Charles Lindley, one of the code commissioners, openly admitted in writing the following:
"The Commission, at my instance, went a little beyond what was contemplated by the Governor when he made the appointments. A revision of the Statutes, and not the expression of a legal system was the scope of the Act and of the appointments." Lindley, California Code Commentaries, Appendix p. ii (1872)
9. The Plaintiffs find that the foregoing is consistent with the language that is found at Section 4479 of the original Political Code, which states:
"If the provisions of any law passed at the present session of the legislature contravene or are inconsistent with the provisions of either of the four codes, the provisions of such law must prevail''.
and thus "self declares" a distinction between "code" and "law". The foregoing has been acknowledged as valid by the California Court of Appeal.
" ... former Political Code section 4479, also passed in 1872 and now, since l951, section 23.1 of the Civil Code, provides that laws inconsistent with the codes passed at the 1872 session prevail over the codes." People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App. 2d, 650, 665.
FOOTNOTE 7: The word "law" here is obviously referring to the Public Statutes of California that receive "chapter numbers" and are published yearly in a volume entitled "Statutes of California".
FOOTNOTE 8: Note that the "code" is specifically distinguished as being different and separate from the "law".
10. Of necessity, all "amendments to the code" and "new divisions" are of the same category and classification, which is further verified by the following:
"The code separation is for convenience only. It is thus well recognized, that for purposes of statutory construction, the codes should be regarded as blending into each other and forming a single statute. Proctor v. Justice's Court of Berkeley, 209 C. 39, 285 P. 312", People v. Foster, 66 Cal.Rptr. 839, 841.
"We have here a code system which is, for convenience and partial classification, divided into four codes, to each of which a name is given; but they are inseparably interwoven, and no one of them is complete in itself, or absolutely confined to a particular subject." Lewis v. Dunne, 134 Cal. 291, 294
FOOTNOTE 9: The use of the term "statute" here can only be construed as being a generic use of the term and does not and cannot be referring to the "Public Statutes of California".
11. From its inception, the "code" is not "law";
"Quad initio vitiosum est non potest tractu temporis convalescere" ... "That which is void from the beginning cannot become valid by lapse of time." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. Another English version states, "Time cannot render valid an act void in its origin."
and is, therefore, not "law" today.
12. Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiffs hereby expressly reserve the right to demand that this court declare any section of the code, used or attempted to be used by the Defendants, as invalid if it can be demonstrated that it is contravened by, or is inconsistent with, any Public Statute of California, or in conflict with any provision of the Constitution of the State of California of 1849, specifically and particularly any section of Article I of said Constitution. Any use of the "code" by the Defendants, which is not contravened by or inconsistent with the Public Statutes of California, is hereby expressly construed by the Plaintiffs to be equivalent to having actually used the actual Public Statutes, in fact, and shall in no way be construed as changing the venue and/or jurisdiction hereinabove expressly stated.
The Source of the Libel
13. On or about February 9, 1997, the Plaintiffs became aware of a printed publication (see Exhibit A) which has apparently been sent out in the mail to various addresses, though the quantity of the names on such a mailing list is unknown to the Plaintiffs. This "mailing list" will be demanded by the Plaintiffs on discovery.
14. Said publication has a heading which distinctly identifies that it is a "SPECIAL BRIEFING" of the "Office of Special Affairs International", an organization of the Church of Scientology.
15. Said publication displays the following at the bottom of the third page (see Exhibit A):
A. " 1997 CSI";
B. Acknowledges permission from the "Religious Technology Center" to use the trademarks of "SCIENTOLOGY"', "LRH", and the "Scientology Cross";
C. Acknowledges permission from the L. Ron Hubbard Library for permission to reproduce selections from the works that are (c) L. Ron Hubbard Library.
FOOTNOTE 10: Note that (c) L. Ron Hubbard and (c) L. Ron Hubbard Library are distinctly different.
16. It is hereby averred by the Plaintiffs that the foregoing is evidence that the highest levels of authority had full knowledge of and gave full approval to the content of said libelous publication, including all written words and the clearly identifiable photographs printed therein. The Plaintiffs believe that it can be established that a long standing procedure of expressly and explicitly protecting the copyrights and trademarks owned by the Church of Scientology exists. The copyright and trademark permission on said libelous publication is hereby construed to be indisputable proof that the subject matter and content of the libelous publication was actually and expressly approved by the Religious Technology Center, the Office of Special Affairs, and the Ron Hubbard Library.
17. The Plaintiffs hereby aver that the ultimate authority for this libelous publication to display " CSI" within the said publication would have had to come from DAVID MISCAVIGE who must be held personally responsible for condoning and/or approving the libelous content therein.
18. The Plaintiffs hereby aver that the ultimate authority to use the material that is trademarked by the "Religious Technology Center" within the said publication would have had to come from DAVID MISCAVIGE who must be held personally responsible for condoning and/or approving the libelous content thereof.
19. The Plaintiffs hereby aver that the ultimate authority to produce the said publication under the heading of the Office of Special Affairs International would have had to come from MIKE RINDER, who must be held personally responsible for condoning and/or approving the libelous content thereof.
20. The Plaintiffs hereby aver that the ultimate authority to use the material that is copyrighted by the L. Ron Hubbard Library within the said publication would have had to come from whoever is in charge of the L. Ron Hubbard Library, and such person must be held personally responsible for condoning and/or approving the libelous content thereof. The identity of this person (Defendant JOHN/JANE DOE #1) will be pursued in the discovery process as this case proceeds.
21. The Plaintiffs hereby aver that the libelous document attempts to draw its authority, in part at least, from a Scientology Policy Directive (SPD), 2 May 1994, Personal Income Taxes. This SPD was issued by the "Tax Compliance Officer" (documentation to be shown at time of trial). The Plaintiffs hereby aver that the provenance of any SPD is questionable, given that SPD's in general violate numerous long-standing Church of Scientology policies as contained in Hubbard Communication Office Policy Letters (documentation to be shown at time of trial). This particular SPD herein referenced does in fact contain misstatements of facts and violates no less than fifty (50) Hubbard Communication Office Policy Letters. The Plaintiffs believe that this particular SPD is a direct result of and draws its authority from the agreement between the Church of Scientology [and] the Internal Revenue Service (commonly known as the "The IRS Peace Treaty"). The text of "The IRS Peace Treaty" will be pursued by the Plaintiffs in discovery in order to prove that the beliefs of the Plaintiffs are in fact true.
Evidence of Libel
22. The Plaintiffs' names and clearly identifiable photographs appear on the front page of said publication. (see Exhibit A)
23. The very first paragraph makes a specific statement that the Plaintiffs, among others, are involved in "illegal" activity. (see Exhibit A)
24. In lines 9-10 of the first column of type on the first page, the publication states, "We are providing you with some facts ... ". (see Exhibit A)
25. The definition of the term "fact" in the Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, demonstrates that said publication is clearly and specifically claiming that the "facts" regarding the alleged "illegal" activities are of the following status:
Fact. A thing done; ... ; an event or circumstance; an actual occurrence; ... ; that which has taken place. The quality of being actual; actual existence or occurrence.
26. In lines 17-18 of the first column of type on the first page, the publications states, "... they are criminals ..." (see Exhibit A). The definition of the term "criminal" (as a noun) in the Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, states, "... one who has been legally convicted of a crime; one adjudged guilty of crime;...". The Plaintiffs have never been convicted of any criminal activity, especially and specifically any type of criminal activity as alleged by this libelous publication put out and/or approved by the Defendants.
27. Beginning at line 15 of the first column on the first page, said publication states, "These individuals portray themselves as "tax protester". The plaintiffs, and each of them, hereby aver that they have never made the claim that they are "tax protesters". (see Exhibit A)
28. The term "tax protester" is used by the Internal Revenue Service to describe people who protest paying "income taxes''. The Internal Revenue Service in fact publishes a six (6) page "FACT SHEET" entitled "TAX PROTESTERS" (see Exhibit B) The Plaintiffs have never been involved in any of the activities as described in this Internal Revenue Document.
FOOTNOTE 11: The Plaintiffs believe that it is correct to presume that the Defendants intend for the information and alleged "facts" in the libelous publication to be referring to "income taxes" administered by the Internal Revenue Service, due to the fact that the four people, named and pictured on the second page of the libelous publication, were all either charged, convicted and/or sentenced for allegedly having violated the law with regard to "income taxes" administered by the Internal Revenue Service.
Evidence That The Libelous Statements Cannot Be True
29. It has been confirmed by publication
in the Federal Register at 39 F.R. 11572, at Sec. 1111.2, that Congress
never specifically created by statute an agency entitled the "Bureau of
Internal Revenue". The Plaintiffs aver that it is an absurd display of
arrogance for Donald C. Alexander, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue
to state in the Federal Register on
March 25, 1974, " ... that Congress had intended to establish a Bureau of Internal Revenue, or thought they had, from the act of March 3, 1863,...". (Documentation to be shown at time of trial).
30. In 1953, the "Internal Revenue Service" was created by the mere fact of the Secretary of the Treasury changing the name of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Treasury Order No. 150- 29, G. M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury, July 9, 1953 [Documentation to be shown at time of trial]). No congressional or presidential authorization for this change has ever been located.
31. Though it is stated at 39 F.R. 11572, at Sec. 1111.2 that " ...the act of July 1, 1862 is the organic act of today's Internal Revenue Service.", the Internal Revenue Service, (and/or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms) is not mentioned as an agency of the United States Department of the Treasury at 31 U.S.C. Section 301. (Documentation to be shown at time of trial)
32. Within the Code of Federal Regulations, there are no Part 1 regulations supportive of 26 U.S.C. 7621, 7801, 7802, and 7803. No regulations have ever been published in the Federal Register that establish any authority for the federal government to do any of the following:
32a. To establish any "revenue districts" within any of the several states.
32b. To extend the authority of the Department of the Treasury to any of the several states.
32c. To give any authority to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue and/or assistants within any of the several states.
32d. To extend any authority of any other Department of the Treasury personnel to any of the several states.
FOOTNOTE 12: Hereinafter to be established at 32a as being the "Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico" as pertains to the Internal Revenue Service and 26 U.S.C.
33. At 27 CFR 250.11, are the following definition:
33a. Revenue Agent. Any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal Revenue Agent of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico.
33b. Secretary. The Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico.
33c. Secretary or his delegate. The Secretary or any officer or employee of the Department of Treasury of Puerto Rico duly authorized by the Secretary to perform the function mentioned or described in this part.
(Documentation to be shown at time of trial)
FOOTNOTE 13: The Plaintiffs have not found any definitions within 26 U.S.C., 27 U.S.C., 26 C.F.R and/or 27 C.F.R. that specifically acknowledge that the "Secretary" therein designated is the "Secretary of the Treasury of the United States" or that the "Department of the Treasury" therein designated is the "Department of the Treasury of the United States".
34. As of the present time, there are only three (3) sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as currently amended, that contain any specific reference to the "several states" of the United States of America, exclusive of the federal States of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, etc. Those three are, 26 U.S.C. Sections 5272(b), 5362(c), and 7462. None of these three sections extend any assessment or collections authority for the Internal Revenue Service or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms within any of the several states. (Documentation to be shown at time of trial)
35. The Internal Revenue Service, is a foreign entity with respect to the several states of the United States of America, and is not registered to do business within the said several states.
36. The Internal Revenue Service is contracted to provide collection services for the Agency for International Development, and case law demonstrates that the true principals of interest are the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Bank of the United States v. Planters Bank of Georgia, 6 L.Ed [Wheat] 244; U.S. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242; 59 Stat 512, Bretton Woods Agreement [Documentation to be shown at time of trial], and 22 USCA Section 286, et seq. [Documentation to be shown at time of trial]). In effect, the Internal Revenue Service provides collection services for undisclosed foreign principals, though everyone is "led to believe" that the Internal Revenue Service is collecting revenue for the benefit of constitutional United States government operation.
37. There is no express liability clause anywhere within 26 U.S.C. to clearly and expressly identify the "person" that is liable for the taxes imposed therein. The only "liability clause" that can be attached to the Internal Revenue Code comes from the statutory origin of the Internal Revenue Code, specifically the "Public Salary Tax Act of 1939" at 53 Stat 574, where it states at Section 4:
"Sec. 4. The United States hereby consents to the taxation of compensation, received after December 31, 1938, for personal service as an officer or employee of the United States, any Territory or possession or political subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing, by duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction to tax such compensation, if such taxation does not discriminate against such officer or employee because of the source of such compensation."
38. The United States District Court in Alabama is very helpful in clarifying that the Plaintiffs have not misconstrued the meaning and intent of the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939. In Jefferson County v. Aker, 850 Fed.Supp. 1536 at 1539, the court clearly shows that the Public Salary tax Act of 1939 has been "codified" at 4 U.S.C. 111 and goes on to clarify that it is only referring to "compensation received by a federal officer or employee,..." The Plaintiffs, and each of them, hereby aver that they are not presently such a "federal officer or employee''[l4], and are therefore not subject to the Internal Revenue Service, and the libel alleged herein is hereby conclusively proven.
FOOTNOTE 14 Plaintiff Lisa Jan Precious was a federal employee on or about July 1979 through March 1980 prior to her having judicial knowledge of any of the facts and/or information presented in this complaint.
Statutory Obligation of the Defendant
39. Where a Complaint for Libel has been brought to bear against a Defendant, " ... the defendant may, in his answer, allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages; and whether he prove the justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances." Stats 1851, ch. V, Section 63, at page 59.
40. The Defendants, are certainly expected to attempt to seek "refuge" somewhere within the venue and jurisdiction of the "code", the status of which has hereinabove [been] conclusively demonstrated. The Defendants will find no refuge there, as even the Civil Code of California at Sections 44, 45 and 45(a) would be supportive of the Complaint herein stated, and the Plaintiffs find that the "code" hereinat referenced is not contravened by or inconsistent with any Public Statute of California, and is therefore, in effect, as valid as any common law and/or statutory definition of the type of actions that constitute "libel".
41. The custom and usage of 26 U.S.C. within the several states of the United States of America, can not provide any refuge for the position of the Defendants in the face of the facts and substantial evidence presented herein, because the Courts have established that within California, "Custom cannot overcome unequivocal statutory provisions." Brown v. State Personnel Board, 43 Cal. App. 2d 70, 75. The Plaintiffs will present adequate evidence at the time of trial in order to prove the statutory provisions which defeat the custom and usage of 26 U.S.C. within any of the several states of the United States of America.
The Plaintiffs hereby aver in this Verified Complaint, that the actions of the Defendants are indisputably and conclusively libelous, and the Defendants must be held liable for the damages as claimed by the Plaintiffs, and each of them, as expressed in the separate Affidavit and Statement of Demand for Damages filed by each Plaintiff in Support of the Verified Complaint for Libel, and said Affidavits are hereby referenced and incorporated hereinat as if fully stated herein. A trial by jury is hereby demanded and required by the Plaintiffs, and each of them.
We, Stephen Mitchell, Lisa Jan Precious, and Kathleen Carey, hereby swear under penalty of perjury, under the law of the Land in California, one of the United States of America, that Paragraphs1 through 41 and the Conclusion hereinabove are true and correct and so done in good faith to the best of our knowledge and belief.
Subscribed and sworn this twenty-ninth day of the seventh month, in the year A.D. nineteen hundred ninety seven.
[L.S.] (SIGNATURE: STEPHEN MITCHELL) seal
[L.S.] (SIGNATURE: LISA PRECIOUS) seal
Lisa Jan Precious
[L.S.] (SIGNATURE: KATHLEEN CAREY) seal